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COMMENTS
TREASURY REGULATIONS SECTION 1.165-3 (b) (2):
LESSOR DEDUCTION FOR DEMOLITION LOSS
It is a well known maxim of the tax counsellor that, just as a post-
ponement of the recognition of income is a tax benefit gained, so also
is the present recognition of a loss a tax benefit gained. In a recent line
of cases involving the demolition of buildings on leased realty, four
United States appellate courts have evidenced a split of authority in
deciding whether United States Treasury Regulations section 1.165-
3(b)(2)1 allows the lessor to deduct as a loss his adjusted basis in a
building demolished by the lessee under a provision in the lease which
merely permits demolition. Under the regulations, the alternative to
deduction in the year of demolition is amortization of the lessor's basis
over the term of the lease. Clearly, the immediate deduction would be
more beneficial to the taxpayer; the amount of benefit, of course, can
be measured by the amount of his basis remaining in the building and
by the number of years over which it would be amortized under the
second alternative.
DEMOLITIoN LossEs GENERALLY
In order to gain a proper perspective for the narrow question con,
sidered by this Comment, an understanding of the treatment of demo-
lition losses generally is useful. The controlling statute is section 165 (a)
of the 1954 Code, 2 which provides: "There shall be allowed as a deduc-
tion any loss sustained during the taxable year and not compensated
for by insurance or otherwise." Thus, in order to qualify for a deduc-
tion, the taxpayer must first show that he has sustained a loss; addi-
tionally, he must prove that his loss is uncompensated.
The regulations applying section 165 (a) to demolition losses may be
said to cover four general fact situations. Where the taxpayer pur-
chased improved property with the intention to demolish the improve-
1. Treas. Reg. § 1.165-3(b) (2), T. D. 6445, 1960-1 CuM. BULL. 99 [hereinafter referred
to as Treas. Reg. § 1.165-3 (b) (2) ].
2. INr. Rxv. CODE OF 1954, § 165 (a).
3. It should be noted that these are general categories of fact situations, and no attempt
is made here to examine the many factual variations which may produce different
results.
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ments, he has sustained no loss.4 The reason stated is that, the land being
the only part of the package of land and buildings that is valuable to
the purchaser, all basis is allocated to the land; consequently, since the
buildings have no basis, the taxpayer could not have sustained any
loss." The other three fact situations occur where the intent to demolish
was formed subsequent to the purchase.6 Where the buildings are de-
molished with no intent to replace them, the loss is deductible. Where
the buildings are demolished to make way for replacement buildings, the
loss is deductible.8 Finally, where the buildings are demolished pur-
suant to the requirements of a lease, no deduction will be allowed.'
This last situation has proved particularly troublesome, and this Com-
ment will focus on variant judicial interpretations of the application
of section 165 to the lease situation.
CONFLICTING JUDICIAL INTERPRETATIONS
The conflict in the courts has arisen over a slight change in language
from the proposed regulations to those finally promulgated in 1960.
Although the Code provisions allowing loss deductions have remained
substantially unchanged since 1918,1° there was no discussion in the
regulations of demolition losses in a lease context1 until the first regu-
lations interpreting the 1954 Code were proposed in 1959.12 The pro-
4. Treas. Reg. § 1.165-3 (a). However, where the purchaser intends to use the build-
ings for a short period of time prior to demolition, he may allocate a proportional part
of their cost to them for depreciation purposes.
5. id.
6. Treas. Reg. 5 1.165-3 (b).
7. Treas. Reg. § 1.165-3 (b) (1).
8. Id. There is a conflict of opinion in the courts, however, over whether this is
the proper treatment of such demolitions. See note 69 infra & accompanying text.
9. Treas. Reg. § 1.165-3 (b) (2).
10. Revenue Act of 1918, Act of Feb. 24, 1919, ch. 18, § 214(a), 40 Stat. 1073 stated:
"(a) In computing net income there shall be allowed as deductions... (4) losses sus-
tained during the taxable year and not compensated for by insurance or otherwise...."
In all succeeding Revenue Acts, the provision allowing loss deductions was retained in
virtually identical language, including IrT. REv. CoDE or 1939, § 23(a) and INT. Ra,.
CODE or 1954, § 165 (a).
11. The regulations, beginning with Treas. Reg. 45, art. 142 (1918), under the
Revenue Act of 1918, also remained substantially the same, concerning themselves pri-
marily with whether demolition was intended by the purchaser at the time he acquired
the property.
12. Proposed Treas. Reg. § 1.165-3(d), 24 Fed. Reg. 8177, 8180 (1959). Section 1.165-
3 (d) provided:
(d) Buildings demolished to obtain lease. If, pursuant to the terms of
a lease, the lessor of real property, demolishes buildings situated thereon, no
deduction shall be allowed to the lessor under section 165 (a) on account of
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posed rule provided that, where the intent to demolish was formed
subsequent to the acquisition of the property, the owner could deduct
as a loss his undepreciated basis in any buildings demolished, except
where the demolition was "pursuant to the terms of a lease." 11 When
section 1.165-3 (b) (2) was finally adopted in 1960,'4 that vital phrase
was changed to "pursuant to the requirements of a lease." Where demo-
lition is pursuant to the requirements of a lease, the lost basis is con-
sidered to be a cost of acquisition of the lease, to be amortized over the
term of the lease. 15
The first court to consider the impact of this change in wording'
was the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit in Feldman v. Wood. 7
In that case, two years after the lessee took possession of the property,
the building was demolished by the lessee under a provision which gave
him the "right" to demolish improvements at his own expense. The
court allowed the lessor to deduct his basis in the building, holding that
the use of the phrase "pursuant to the requirements of a lease" in the
regulations necessarily implied that where demolition was merely per-
mitted by a lease, deduction of the full adjusted basis must be allowed in
the year of demolition.' 8 The split of authority emerged when Lander-
man v. Commissioner,9 the only case to originate in the Tax Court,20
the demolition of the buildings. Likewise, if, pursuant to the terms of a
lease, the lessee of real property demolishes the buildings, no deduction
shall be allowed to the lessor. However, the adjusted basis of the demolished
buildings shall be considered as a part of the cost of the lease to be amor-
tized over the term thereof. (emphasis supplied)
13. id.
14. Treas. Reg. § 1.165-3 (b) (2) states:
(2) If a lessor or lessee of real property demolishes the buildings situated
thereon pursuant to the requirements of a lease or the requirements of an
agreement which resulted in a lease, no deduction shall be allowed to the
lessor under section 165(a) on account of the demolition of the old build-
ings. However, the adjusted basis of the demolished buildings, increased by
the net cost of demolition and decreased by the net proceeds fxom demoli-
tion, shall be considered as a part of the cost of the lease to be amortized
over the term thereof. (emphasis supplied)
15. Id.
16. Actually, the first case decided under § 1.165-3(b) (2) was Nicholl's Estate v.
Commissioner, 282 F.2d 895 (7th Cir. 1960), but that opinion did not address directly
the problem here discussed. There, the lease obligated the lessee to demolish the
building, so there was no need to construe the term "requirements."
17. 335 F.2d 264 (9th Cir. 1964).
18. The Internal Revenue Service declined to follow Feldman in Rev. Rul. 67-410,
1967-2 CuM. BuLL. 93.
19. 454 F.2d 338 (7th Cir. 1971).
20. 54 T.C. 1042 (1970). All four of the other principal cases discussed herein, origi-
nated in district courts.
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was decided by the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit. The Tax
Court had found that demolition of the building was negotiated exten-
sively and was contemplated by the parties as an underlying condition
of the lease.21 The court of appeals held that the term "requirements"
in the regulation should not be read restrictively, for two basic reasons.
First, the word itself can connote something that is wanted, needed,
called for, or a necessary condition,22 and, so defined, may include some-
thing that is merely permitted by the lease, as long as it is important
to the bargain between lessor and lessee. Second, the court said, the
regulation must be read in light of earlier case law, and since the basic
rule derived by the early decisions was that demolitions intended at the
execution of the lease were not deductible,-3 the distinction betveen
demolitions permitted and those required was an artificial one. Thus,
it was held in Landerman that the regulations were not intended to dis-
tinguish between optional and mandatory demolition provisions, or to
make any basic alteration in the existing rule,24 and the taxpayer's deduc-
tion was disallowed.
The next case to be decided under section 1.165-3 (b) (2) was Holder
v. United States,25 in the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit. In
Holder, the lease gave the lessee the right to demolish but required
him to replace demolished buildings with new buildings meeting cer-
tain specifications. It was stipulated by the parties that at the time of
execution, the lessee had no immediate plans for demolition and that
the replacement requirement was included solely to protect the lessor
against the possibility that the lessee might demolish the buildings and
then terminate the lease. The court did not reach the construction
problem which was the basis of Feldman and Landerman.2 6 Rather, it
reasoned that the regulation is inoperative until the taxpayer shows
himself to be within section 165 (a) by proving an uncompensated loss.
In the Holder situation, the court held that the taxpayer was compen-
sated by the lessee's obligation to replace the demolished building, and
21. 54 T.C. 1042, 1047.
22. 454 F.2d 338, 340. The court cites WEBSTER's THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL Dic-
TONARY, UNABRIDGED for the definitions.
23. See notes 37-47 infra & accompanying text.
24. This is the position the Commissioner takes in Rev. Rul. 67-410, 1967-2 CuM.
BULL. 93.
25. 444 F.2d 1297 (5th Cir. 1971).
26. Actually, Holder was decided shortly before the Court of Appeals decision in
Landerman was handed down, but after the Tax Court decision, which rested on the
same basis. Thus, while Landerman technically had not been decided, the Holder court
still refused to reach the same arguments.
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thus could not claim the benefit of section 1.165-3 (b) (2). The approach
taken by the court in Holder poses an interesting question 27 which will
be discussed below.Y
In Foltz v. United States,20 the taxpayer, Mrs. Foltz, had unsuccess-
fully negotiated for a lease, during which negotiations she sought an
annual rental of $6,000. She had refused to permit demolition by the
lessee. Subsequently, she entered into negotiations with another party
who was represented by the same man who represented the first pro-
spective lessee. This time, Mrs. Foltz agreed to an optional demolition
provision, and the lease finally executed called for an annual rental of
$9,000. It was clear that the lessee, a bank, wanted the property to
facilitate expansion of its physical plant. It was not clear from the
district court's findings of fact, however, whether the bank expected
to have to demolish the existing building. The Court of Appeals for
the Eighth Circuit summarily treated the issue of the interpretation of
section 1.165-3 (b) (2), relying exclusively on the reasoning in Lander-
man, and noting that the distinction between optional and mandatory
demolition provisions enunciated by Feldman ignored the necessity of
determining whether the loss was in fact compensated. However, the
court held that "the critical question" in the case was not the inter-
pretation of the regulation but the existence of an uncompensated loss
in the first instance.30 The court found that specific terms in the lease-
the large rental, the lessee's obligation to pay the costs of demolition,
and the fact that the lessor eventually would obtain title to the new
improvements-compensated the taxpayer for her loss.
In Hightower v. United States,31 three buildings were demolished by
the lessee pursuant to a permissive provision in the lease. The district
court 32 found that the lessor had not required the lessee to demolish the
building as a condition precedent to obtaining the lease, but that the
lessee would not have agreed to the lease had the lessor not included the
optional demolition provision. It should be noted that Hightower was
decided by the same court that decided Holder. In this instance, how-
ever, the court justified its conclusion that the case was within the
27. In holding that the regulations cannot be considered until it is determined whether
the taxpayer sustained a taxable loss, the court appears to be ignoring the purpose of
the regulations-to interpret the Code and explain what "loss... not compensated for by
insurance or otherwise" is intended to mean.
28. See text accompanying notes 62-67 infra.
29. 458 F.2d 600 (8th Cir. 1972).
30. Id. at 603.
31. 463 F.2d 182 (5th Cir. 1972).
32. 346 F. Supp. 707, 709 (M.D. Fla. 1971).
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regulation by finding that the lessee was not obligated to replace the
demolished building and that, consequently, the lessor was not directly
compensated for his lossY3 The court went on to hold that section
1.165-3 (b) (2) must be read restrictively, solely on the basis of Feld-
man. 34 Thus, on the narrow question of whether the lessor may deduct
as a loss his basis in buildings demolished under permissive lease provi-
sions, the Ninth and Fifth Circuits, in Feldman and Hightower, conflict
with holdings of the Seventh and Eighth Circuits in Landerman and
Foltz.
INTERPRETATION OF SECTION 1.165-3 (b) (2)
In order to reach any conclusions about what the change in wording
in section 1.165-3 (b) (2) was intended to accomplish, it is necessary to
examine the scope of the Code section, the rule in the regulations re-
garding demolition absent a lease, and the state of the law with reference
to demolition in a lease context prior to the adoption of section 1.165-
3 (b) (2).
As noted below, there are two prerequisites to deductibilty under
section 165(a): First, there must be a loss, and second, the loss must
be uncompensated. Under the regulations, the test for the first require-
ment-the existence of a loss-is the purchaser's intent. Under section
1.165-3 (a), if the purchaser intended demolition at the time he acquired
the property, he sustained no loss, and there is no need to consider the
question of compensation. Under section 1.165-3 (b), if the intent to
demolish was formed subsequent to acquisition of the property, the
taxpayer has met the first requirement because, at the time he purchased
the property, the buildings presumably had some value from his view-
point, and part of his investment was allocated to them. When the
buildings subsequently became worthless to him and he demolished
them, he lost that part of his investment which he had not yet recovered
through depreciation. His loss was compounded by the fact that he had
to pay money to remove the buildings. However, he was compensated
for his loss to the extent that he was able to recover his investment by
salvaging the materials reclaimed through demolition. The regulations
recognize this state of affairs by providing: "[T] he amount of the loss
shall be the adjusted basis of the buildings demolished increased by the
net costs of demolition or decreased by the net proceeds from demoli-
tion." '5 Thus, the regulations offset any compensation (salvage) against
33. 463 F.2d 182, 183.
34. 463 F.2d 182.
35. Treas. Reg. § 1.165-3 (b) (2). See also Union Bed & Spring Co. v. Commissioner,
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unrecovered capital investment in computing the amount of deductible
loss.
The regulations prior to the enactment of the 1954 Code, although
interpreting virtually the same language as that incorporated in the
present section 165 (a),36 did not attempt to deal with demolition losses
in a lease context, as already noted. This left the courts free to develop
their own rule regarding the lease situation. The courts were generally
agreed3 7 that where demolition was "necessary to the purposes of a
lease" 8 -that is, where it was contemplated by the parties as a necessary
condition precedent to the lease agreement 9-then the lessor was com-
pensated for his loss by the acquisition of a valuable lease.40
A "substitution of assets" was said to have taken place4' (the lease
for the building), and the basis of the demolished building was allocated
to the lease as a cost of acquisition, and amortized over the term of
the lease.42 If the buildings actually had become worthless to the lessor
before the lease was executed, the lease could not be said to be com-
pensation for the loss.4 On the other hand, if the buildings were still
usable by the lessor, and his decision to give the lessee the option to
demolish was motivated by the fact that the lease was more profitable
than putting the buildings to some other use, then the lessor was said
to have bargained away his investment intentionally for something of
greater value. The lease, then, was "substituted" for the buildings, and
any remaining basis in them had to be recovered over the term of the
lease, as did any other cost of acquisition. For example, in Manning v.
Commissioner,44 the taxpayer entered into a lease under which the
lessee was to construct a theater on the whole of the land. Although
39 F.2d 533 (7th Cir. 1930); Piedmont Nat'l. Bank v. United States, 162 F. Supp. 919
(W.D.S.C. 1958); Louis Pizitz Dry Goods Co. v. Commissioner, 22 B.T.A. 161 (1931).
36. See note 10 supra.
37. A few early Board of Tax Appeals cases did not follow the generally accepted
rule of "substitution of assets." See, e.g., McNeill v. Commissioner, 16 B.T.A. 479 (1929),
which held that when a lessor leases property the lessee gains a capital asset-the
leasehold estate-but the lessor has merely made a sale, and therefore may immediately
deduct any costs of acquiring the lease.
38. Blumenfield Enterprises v. Commissioner, 23 T.C. 665 (1955).
39. Nicholl's Estate v. Commissioner, 282 F.2d 895 (7th Cir. 1960).
40. Smith Real Estate Co. v. Page, 67 F.2d 462 (1st Cir. 1933).
41. Myer Dana v. Commissioner, 30 B.T.A. 83 (1934); Harper v. Commissioner, 27
B.T.A. 293 (1932).
42. Young v. Commissioner, 59 F.2d 691 (9th Cir. 1932), cert. denied, 287 U.S. 652
(1932).
43. Smith Real Estate Co. v. Page, 67 F.2d 462 (1st Cir. 1933).
44. 7 B.T.A. 286 (1927).
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there was no mention of demolition in the lease, the court found that,
since the theater could not be built until the existing structure was re-
moved, demolition was necessary to the purpose of the lease. The loss
being compensated by the quid pro quo of the lease, no deduction was
allowed. In so holding, the court said:
There was in this instance what amounted to a substitution of
assets; instead of an asset in the form of buildings, the petitioners
now have another asset, viz., a lease, the giving up or voluntary
destruction of the buildings being a necessary incident to the ac-
quisition of the lease. 45
From the reasoning in these cases, 46 with their emphasis on con-
templation of demolition and demolition "necessary to the purposes of
the lease," it might be supposed that the converse of the rule they state
is also true-that is, where the right to demolish is included in the lease
merely as protection for the lessee in the event the improvements be-
come useless in the future, the lessor did not intend to bargain away
the right to have his assets remain on the land and therefore was not
compensated for his loss. However, there appear to be no cases that
purport to resolve the issue. The case that comes closest to that situation
is Blumenfield Enterprises v. Commissioner,47 where the taxpayer agreed
to lease a theater to the lessee, who was to remodel it into a parking
garage. Demolition of the theater clearly was not contemplated be-
cause the anticipated alterations were slight. After execution of the
lease, such remodeling became unfeasible, and the lessor allowed the
lessee to demolish the theater and use the land for street level parking.
The court recognized that demolition initially was not contemplated, but
held that since the fundamental purpose of the lease would have been
defeated if existing structures had not been demolished, the lessor could
not deduct his adjusted basis.48 The clear implication of this decision is
that, regardless of the parties' original contemplation and the nature of
their bargain, the courts were willing to hold that whenever it becomes
advantageous to the lessee to demolish and he exercises his option under
45. Id. at 290.
46. See cases cited notes 38-44 supra. See also Camp Wolters Land Co. v. Commis-
sioner, 160 F.2d 84 (5th Cir. 1947); Spinks Realty Co. v. Burnett, 62 F.2d 462 (D.C.
Cir. 1932), cert. denied, 290 U.S. 636 (1933); Anahma Realty Corp. v. Commissioner,
42 F.2d 128 (2d Cir. 1930); Berger v. Commissioner, 7 T.C. 1339 (1946).




the lease, the lessor must recover his investment through amortization
over the term of the lease.
Consequently, it was no surprise when, in 1959, the newly proposed
regulations 9 made the owner's basis non-deductible whenever demoli-
tion was "pursuant to the terms of a lease." ao The effect of such lan-
guage is to render irrelevant the lessor's intent to exchange the right to
demolish for the acquisition of a valuable lease, so long as demolition is
mentioned in the lease. This may seem to represent a modification of
the rule established in the courts, but it must be remembered that al-
though the courts spoke in terms of the intentional substitution of assets,
they managed to find such substitution even in cases like Blumenfield
Enterprises, where the lessor clearly had not contemplated demolition.
The inequitable situations which may arise under such a rule have
been noted by one commentator, 51 who suggested that a lessor may lease
a building with a 25-year useful life for a 99-year term, fully anticipat-
ing that the lessee will continue to use it until he has fully depreciated
its basis. In such a lengthy lease, the right to demolish must be granted
as a matter of course; otherwise, the lessee may find himself encum-
bered with a useless building after 25 years. Yet, if for some reason
the building becomes useless before anticipated, and the lessee demolishes
it, the lessor may not deduct his basis as he could in similar circum-
stances absent a lease. Instead, he must amortize his loss over a period
of 99 years-simply because the demolition was pursuant to the "terms"
of a lease.
The fact that such situations cannot be treated equitably under such
a rule may provide a clue to the purpose of changing "terms of a lease"
to "requirements of a lease" in the regulations. In 1960, following the
adoption of that change, it was observed52 that denying a loss deduction
only where demolition was "required" could contribute to eliminating
the undesirable result of amortization over a lengthy period where
the demolition was not contemplated seriously by the lessor. The court
in Landerman7P held that the desire to eliminate such inequities was the
49. Proposed Treas. Reg. § 1.165-3 (d). See note 12 supra.
50. Id. (Emphasis supplied).
51. Raby, New Regulations Clarify Loss on Demolition of Leased Property, 13 J. oF
TAXATioN 227 (1960).
52. Id.
53. 454 F.2d at 341. The Tax Court reached the same conclusion at 54 T.C. 1042,
1046-47, where it stated:
As we see it, the attempt by respondent to deal with demolition in a lease
context and the evolution of his regulations were designed to make the
immediate contemplation and the bargaining stance of the parties, at the
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probable reason for the change in regulations, and, in light of the con-
siderations just discussed, this appears to be a reasonable conclusion.
It appears, then, that the divergent judicial interpretations of section
1.165-3 (b) (2) may be explained in the following manner: Landerman
and Foltz would read the phrase "pursuant to the requirements of a
lease" to call for an inquiry into whether the underlying purposes of
the lease, as contemplated by the parties at the time of execution, "re-
quire" the demolition, rather than whether the lessor "requires" the
lessee to demolish. This interpretation would maintain the rule devel-
oped in the courts without the attendant inequitable results.r The
interpretation adopted by Feldman and Hightower, on the other hand,
would refrain from any inquiry into the parties' intent, and determine
deductibility solely on the basis of whether demolition by the lessee is
optional or mandatory."5 Indeed, the court in Feldman held that the
rule developed in the courts was entirely superseded by the regula-
tions." ' The problem with this approach is that deductibility is made
to turn upon a matter of semantics-the lessor is empowered to bring
himself within section 165 (a) simply by phrasing the demolition pro-
vision as optional rather than mandatory. For example, in Hightower,
although the district court specifically had found" that the lessor was
aware that the lessee would not agree to the lease without receiving the
right to demolish, and that demolition was completed less than two
time the lease arrangements were made, the focal point of determination.
By so doing, problems of optional demolition at a much later period of
the lease would be avoided.
The court concluded:
In short, we hold that respondents regulations were intended to encom-
pass an examination of whether demolition was sufficiently within the
contemplation of the parties at the time the lease arrangements were made
that it can be said that the demolition was an underlying condition of those
arrangements.
54. Such an interpretation approximates but is not identical to the Internal Revenue
Service's own interpretation of the regulation in Rev. Rul. 67-410, 1967-2 Cum. BuLL. 93.
There, the Service made it clear that as long as the demolition arises in a lease context,
it is not deductible, whether it is permitted or required, and regardless of the lessor's
intent at the time of execution. In fact, the Service probably cannot argue "substitu-
tion of assets" because in 1.165-3 (b) (1) it states explicitly that when, absent a lease,
a taxpayer demolishes one building to make way for another, the basis of the old
building is never added to that of the new. As will be seen later, the two positions
are contradictory. See text following note 74 infra.
55. Feldman v. Wood, 335 F.2d 264, 265 (9th Cir. 1964); Hightower v. United States,
346 F. Supp. 707, 712 (M.D. Fla. 1971). The district court cite is given for Hightower
because the court of appeals merely incorporates the district court's reasoning.
56. 335 F.2d at 266.
57. 346 F. Supp. at 709.
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months after the lessee took possession, the court still held that since
the lessee had the right, but not the obligation to demolish, the lessor's
loss was deductible. Clearly, if the true test of deductibility (the
existence of an uncompensated loss) is the lessor's intent to bargain
away his rights in the building in exchange for the acquisition of a lease,
then the distinction between whether demolition is "permitted" or
"required," the way Feldman and Hightower read those terms, is an
arbitrary one which exalts form over substance and which ignores the
requirement of section 165 (a) that losses be in fact uncompensated.
It is thus apparent that, on the narrow question raised-whether the
term "requirements" should be read restrictively-the courts in Lander-
man and Foltz have the better-reasoned position. Assuming that the
"substitution of assets" approach is proper, there is no rational basis for
distinguishing between optional and mandatory demolition provisions.
In either case the lease has been substituted for the building-or has not
been substituted for the building-according to the lessor's intent. And
as the court in Landerman indicated, 59 the term "requirements" can
connote "an essential condition," which definition fits precisely within
the rule developed in earlier cases.
In any event, the Internal Revenue Service apparently has decided
to eliminate the controversy. New regulations have been proposed
which would disallow a deduction whenever demolition is "required
or permitted by a lease or by an agreement which resulted in a lease." 60
To be sure, this language would eliminate the possibility of further
decisions following Feldman or Hightower, but the effect would be
identical to that of the regulation originally proposed in 1959.1 That
is, any time demolition is mentioned in the "terms of a lease" the deduc-
tion would be disallowed, regardless of the lessor's intent, and that
result surely would be just as arbitrary as attempting to distinguish
between optional and mandatory provisions.
THE Holder RATIoNALE
Bearing in mind the scope and purpose of section 1.165-3(b) (2),
some conclusions may be drawn regarding the basis for the decision in
58. The findings of fact in Hightower, for example, would indicate that the parties
anticipated immediate demolition, which would bring the case within the substitution
of assets rule. See note 57 supra & accompanying text.
59. 454 F.2d at 340.
60. Proposed Treas. Reg. § 1.165-3(b) (2), 37 Fed. Reg. 7891 (April 21, 1972).
61. Proposed Treas. Reg. § 1.165-3 (d). See note 12, supra.
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Holder v. United States.52 There, the court held that before the regu-
lation could even be considered the taxpayer had to bring himself with-
in section 165 (a) by proving that he had sustained an uncompensated
loss. The court in Foltz based its decision substantially on the same
ground. Both courts found that the lessors were compensated for their
losses by specific provisions in the respective leases. This approach seems
inappropriate for two reasons. First, it overlooks the purpose of the
regulations, which is to interpret the Code provisions. Specifically,
section 1.165-3(b)(2) is intended to define the circumstances under
which a demolition loss is "compensated" within the meaning of section
165. This is especially clear in light of the foregoing analysis of the
history of this regulation. Both Holder and Foltz appear to reach their
conclusions concerning the requirements of section 165 without con-
sidering the regulation which is the authority established by Congress
for giving effect to the Code provisions. It is one thing for a court to
examine a regulation and find that it falls short of accomplishing its
purpose adequately, and quite another to short-circuit the process by
formulating its own tests without regard to the regulation. Both courts
appear to be answering the question before it is properly stated.
Second, the compensation that the Holder and Foltz decisions find is
not generally held to be relevant. Both courts found that the lessor was
compensated by the right to possession of replacement buildings upon
termination of the lease.0 3 It has been held, however, that the presence
or absence of a requirement to replace demolished structures is irrele-
vant in determining compensation . 4 Further, it is difficult to find any
rationale for amortizing the old basis over the term of the lease, rather
than over the life of the replacement, if indeed the replacement is the
compensation. Foltz also held that the lessor received compensation
when the lessee relieved him of the eventual burden of the cost of
demolition."' However, the distinction between demolition costs borne
by the lessor and those borne by the lessee is regarded as irrelevant by
section 1.165-3 (b) (2); moreover, the arbitrary distinction was rejected
specifically in Nicholl's Estate v. Conmissioner0
Actually, this approach may be merely another way of stating the
62. 444 F.2d 1297 (Sth Cir. 1971).
63. 444 F.2d at 1300; Foltz v. United States, 458 F.2d 600 (8th Cir. 1972).
64. Berger v. Commissioner, 7 T.C. 1339 (1946), held that whether the lessee was obli-
gated to replace the demolished building was irrelevant. It was the lease itself which was
the compensation, not the specific lease provisions.
65. 458 F.2d at 603.
66. 282 F.2d 895 (7th Cir. 1960).
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argument used consistently by the government viz., the taxpayer must
show that he has sustained some economic loss. However, this argu-
ment should not be deemed controlling, because, as expressed in Feld-
man, 7 it is difficult to conceive of a situation where a property owner
would demolish if it were not for the prospect of making a more profit-
able use of his land. Yet, section 1.165-3 (b) (1) allows a deduction for
demolitions absent a lease without questioning whether the particular
transaction is economically advantageous. Thus, economic losses are
not the only losses deductible under section 165 (a). The fundamental
question is probably one of "taxable event"-when is the most conven-
ient time for recovering one's investment in a demolished building?
VALIDITY OF SECTION 1.165-3 (b) (2)
Having concluded from pre-regulation cases that section 1.165-
3(b) (2) embodies a modified version of the "substitution of assets"
theory,68 it remains to be determined whether, as a matter of policy, the
regulation as interpreted achieves a desirable result. This involves an
inquiry into whether the regulation properly expresses the test required
by the statute. As already discussed, the basic requirement of section
165 (a) is that, to be deductible, a loss must be uncompensated. 9 The
question thus becomes: Is the substitution of assets theory an appro-
priate method of determining 'when a demolition loss is compensated?
In making this determination, it is helpful to consider the treatment of
demolition losses absent a lease.
Section 1.165-3 (b) (1) provides that "[t]he basis of any building ac-
quired in replacement of the old buildings shall not include any part
of the basis of the property demolished." Thus, where a property owner
demolishes an old building in order to make room on his land for a new
building, he may immediately deduct his basis in the old building as a
loss. Clearly, in this situation, if the "substitution of assets" approach
were taken, it could be argued that the taxpayer was forced to give up
his old building in order to acquire the new one. In that event, he
would be forced to treat his lost basis in the old building as a cost of
acquiring the new one, and add the basis of the old building to that of
the new structure. Thus, it appears that under section 1.165-3 (b) (1)
the "substitution of assets" theory is not applied to demolitions absent
67. 335 F.2d 264, 266.
68. See notes 36-45 supra & accompanying text.
69. It can reasonably be assumed that § 165(a) itself calls for a desirable result in that
only uncompensated losses should be deductible.
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a lease. It is manifest that if section 1.165-3(b)(2) is based on the
"substitution of assets" theory (and by all indications it is), then sec-
tions 1.165-3(b)(1) and (2) are inherently contradictory. In one
situation, if the owner must give up an old building to gain a new one
which is more profitable, he may take an immediate deduction; in the
lease situation, however, if the owner must give up an old building to
gain a lease agreement which is more profitable, he must spread his loss
over the term of the lease.
Of course, the mere fact that the Internal Revenue Service improperly
allows one deduction is no justification for allowing it elsewhere on the
same improper grounds. However, it is far from clear that the deduc-
tion for demolition absent a lease is improper. There is a distinct divi-
sion of authority concerning whether a substitution of assets takes place
when an old building is demolished to make way for a new one.70 It
has been said that the general rule is that there is a substitution of assets
because the transaction as to the old building has not yet closed,7' since
the old building still has value. However, it is difficult to understand
how the transaction is any more open in that situation than it is, for in-
stance, when an old building is sold in order to obtain capital to invest
in a new building on other property. Yet, in the latter case, the
owner would be allowed to recoup his basis from the sale price.72 To
complicate the situation still further, conflicting courts do not deal spe-
cifically with each other's views or provide any basis for distinguishing
one line of cases from another. The conflict in the courts, however,
does not provide any justification for the contradictory treatment of
two analogous fact situations within the regulations.
Another aspect of the substitution of assets approach also appears
to be unclear. The lessor is said to have exchanged demolition and
70. Compare Appleby's Estate v. Commissioner, 123 F.2d 700 (2nd Cir. 1941); R.K.O.
Theaters v. United States, 163 F. Supp. 598 (Ct. Cis. 1958) (where a building is demol-
ished to make way for a more valuable one, its basis must be capitalized and amortized
as a cost of acquisition), with Union Bed & Spring Co. v. Commissioner, 39 F.2d 533
(7th Cir. 1930); Herbert Burwig (T.C. Mem., Doc. No. 37227, 1953); Louis Pizitz
Dry Goods Co. v. Commissioner, 22 B.T.A. 161 (1931).
It should be noted that, while the Service will not challenge a demolition deduction
on the basis of the intent to replace the old building, a taxpayer who litigates the issue
of whether the intent to demolish was formed at the time of purchase (1.165-3 (a),
may win that issue only to find that the court has disallowed the deduction on the
"substitution of assets" theory. Consequently it is best to attempt to obtain a stipula-
tion from the government that if the taxpayer wins the intent issue the loss is de-
ductible, as was done in Cosmopolitan Corp., 59-122 P. H. Memo. T.C. (1959).
71. Appleby's Estate v. Commissioner, 123 F.2d 700 (2d Cir. 1941).
72. This conclusion assumes that INT. REv. CODE OF 1954 § 1031 does not apply.
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depreciation rights for a valuable lease and the right to amortize his old
basis as a cost of acquisition. It would seem logical, if there is a sub-
stitution, to hold that it takes place when the lease is executed rather
than when the building is demolished.78 Yet, under the regulations the
lessor is allowed to depreciate his basis at the faster rate (where useful
life is shorter than the term of the lease) until the building is actually
demolished. As a practical matter then, it may be said that the demo-
lition is contingent upon the lessee's plans, but to be theoretically con-
sistent, amortization should begin upon execution of the lease if "sub-
stitution of assets" is to be used as the rationale for later disallowing
a deduction for the demolition loss.
CoNcLusIoN
As a result of the present confusion in the state of the case law and
the multiplicity of arguments for and against deductibility, it is likely
that the Feldman, Hightower-Landerman, Foltz split will grow to in-
clude other courts. In the meantime, prospective lessors who find them-
selves in the position of having to surrender demolition rights to lessees
should frame demolition provisions in optional terms in anticipation of
acceptance of the Feldman rule, as well as ensuring that they will be
compensated in the event their deductions are disallowed. It has been
suggested that the lessor could require the lessee to reimburse him for
the projected difference in tax dollars between an immediate loss deduc-
tion and the amortization write-off, in the event the loss is disallowed.714
In the long run, it is hoped that a consistent treatment of demolition
losses eventually will be developed. The present inconsistencies between
section 1.165-3 (b) (1) and section 1.165-3 (b) (2) provides the explana-
tion of why the Service has been content merely to recite section
1.165-3(b) (2) in the four principal cases, rather than affirmatively
arguing "substitution of assets". It is well accepted that the Internal
Revenue Service is not permitted to argue against its own regulations.
In any event, inconsistencies permeating the entire area of demolition
losses are sufficient to justify an inquiry into the basic rationale for de-
termining when a loss is compensated under section 165 (a). And since
new regulations are now being contemplated, this would appear to be
an appropriate time for a revision of the whole of section 1.165-3 into
a uniform treatment of demolition losses in every context.
73. This possibility was suggested as an undesirable extention of the "substitution
of assets" theory in Raby, New Regulations Clarify Loss on Demolition of Leased
Property, 13 J. or TAXA-TON 227 (1960).
74. 36 J. or TAxAnoN 235, 236 (1972).
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